Defend Our Defenders

Recent high-profile cases from national and local security forces, as well as critical reviews of internal cultures, indicate that the UK’s security forces are under threat from far-right extremism. This paper addresses this challenge in the UK context, focusing on the police and military services, and offers practical guidance and recommendations. The analysis highlights the following four critical areas for reform:

1. Vetting processes are essential. However, it seems that there remain significant gaps and challenges in effectively identifying potential extremists. This poses a considerable risk, particularly as far-right organisations strategically infiltrate security forces, exploiting organisational similarities and cultural overlaps.

2. Training emerges as a critical area for prevention. The need for continuous, well-structured training programmes is emphasised, with a focus on addressing hypermasculinity and racism. Fostering a culture that counters stigma around mental health is also identified as a crucial factor in reducing radicalisation risk, aligning with the broader goal of building resilient and adaptive security forces.

3. Accountability mechanisms within security forces are equally important, especially in the face of an evolving extremist threat. Transparency, consistency and leadership support in enforcing consequences for misconduct and extremist ideologies are highlighted.

4. Separation from the police or military is identified as a critical phase of vulnerability to radicalisation. Comprehensive support programmes, including mental health assistance, exit interviews and tailored interventions, are highlighted as crucial for successful reintegration into civilian life.

Addressing these challenges is vital to building the resilience of the UK’s security forces against extremist influences.

INTRODUCTION

Since the events of 6 January 2021 in the US, where former and active security service members participated in the attack on the country’s Capitol, and high-profile cases of service members engaging in far-right extremism in Germany, there has been a growing focus on the threat posed by serving and former security force members in these and other countries. This is especially the case in light of the shifting focus over the past few years to far-right extremism and terrorism as a predominant threat in these regions. Research into the phenomenon and prevention efforts addressing the issue of far-right extremism in national security services are underway in the US, Canada, Germany and other countries.

In the UK, instances of suspected far-right extremism among active and former members of the police and armed forces have led to referrals to the government’s Prevent scheme and investigations into far-right extremism-related concerns, as well as prison sentences both for membership of proscribed far-right organisations and attempts to recruit other members of the security forces.

These cases underline the gravity of the issue, as even a small number of individuals within the security forces engaging in extremist activities poses a significant reputational risk to those forces. Links between service members and extremism present a profound threat to the foundations of democratic societies. When those sworn to protect and defend society are associated with extremism or terrorism, the societal trust they break with their actions has a deep impact, undermining institutions and the missions they are meant to uphold. Public trust is imperative for the effective functioning of the security services and their ability to carry out their mandates.

Beyond the threat to public confidence, there is also the internal impact of diminshed trust within security services. Environments where racism, sexism and extremism are prevalent can hinder operational efficiency. If force personnel feel marginalised, harassed or attacked they will not be able to complete their duties to the best of their abilities. In addition, if marginalised or “out-group” communities (those people who do not belong to a specific “in-group”) do not feel the security services are a welcoming environment, future recruitment and retention will be increasingly difficult.

This paper aims to address this issue in the UK context, focusing on the police and the armed forces, to provide practical guidance to mitigate potential threats. It forms part of a broader RUSI project exploring structural, training and cultural dynamics within national security forces that can enhance or reduce resilience against the entrance and spread of far-right extremism. The paper is not intended to be comprehensive, but rather presents initial findings and actionable policy recommendations from this wider project.

The paper first outlines the current situation in the UK, examining recent cases of and institutional responses to far-right extremism in the security forces. Subsequently, the paper discusses four areas of concern – vetting procedures, training and education, internal governance and separation processes – where adaptations of existing measures could enhance resilience to violent extremist influences. For each area, the paper explores current measures, discusses their limitations, and provides recommendations for building resilience, emphasising that the goal is not to stigmatise security service members but to safeguard their wellbeing and build resilience to violent extremism.

METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

The research for this paper took a qualitative approach, reviewing existing literature on extremism, with a focus on far-right extremism within the security services. This included a targeted review of current cases of violent extremism and terrorism investigations in the UK, encompassing both current and former service members. The paper builds on open source materials, grey and academic literature, and media reports. Additionally, insights are drawn from recent reviews into institutional cultures, such as the Baroness Casey Review of the Metropolitan Police Service (the Casey Review).

It is important to note that there are significant limitations on access to primary data in this area of research. It is extremely difficult to interview serving members of the UK’s military and police on this subject, as they are bound by their service contracts. Consequently, information about cases of far-right extremism and preventive approaches within the security services is scarce. The lack of clear and published policies and documentation of procedures from these services compounds the challenge. The consequent reliance on media reporting introduces a potentially skewed picture, as cases reported may not have led to charges or legal action, due to insufficient evidence.

Given these limitations, it is important to highlight that this paper does not claim to offer a comprehensive assessment of existing policies or cases. Rather, its purpose is to initiate a discussion within the UK context on the highlighted concerns.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

This section identifies some of the key concerns for the UK’s military and police in relation to preventing far-right extremism from spreading through the ranks. External threats include infiltration by extremists, while internal threats include cultural dynamics which allow sentiments of misogyny and racism to fester and increase members’ vulnerability to far-right extremism.

Referrals to the UK government’s Prevent programme in relation to suspected far-right extremism have been made from across the armed forces, including the RAF air cadets and army cadets. Although up-to-date figures are not available, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has revealed that between 2019 and October 2022, 40 personnel from the Army, Navy and Air Force were investigated for extremism-related concerns. Defence Intelligence has also stated that of the 14 MoD Prevent referrals in 2019, 13 were related to far-right concerns. For January to November 2020, there were a further seven referrals, with the majority (six) linked to far-right activities. This follows the arrest of four serving members of the Army in 2017 for suspected membership of National Action, a proscribed far-right organisation. Lance Corporal Mikko Vehvilainen was subsequently sentenced to eight years in prison for membership of a proscribed organisation and attempts to recruit other soldiers. There have been similar concerns in relation to the police, after Benjamin Hannam became the first serving officer to be convicted of a terrorism offence – also related to membership of National Action – in 2021. The subsequent convictions of serving members of police and prison staff for terrorism offences linked to their far-right beliefs suggests that this threat extends beyond frontline officers.

Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee has warned about the “insider threat” of far-right extremists actively seeking to infiltrate and recruit within the military and the police. The government has acknowledged that the security forces present an attractive target for groups to gain training and access to weaponry and equipment, and as a site for recruitment. Well-known far-right extremists such as Jack Renshaw – currently serving life in prison for a plot to kill MP Rosie Cooper in 2017 – have attempted to join the armed forces. National Action has also directly encouraged members to enlist in the military or police and to conceal their views during the recruitment process. The idea of enlisting in the Army was also a frequent point of discussion in a Telegram channel run by “the British Hand” terrorist cell, with some members appearing to have joined the army cadets.

The Army has stated that far-right ideology is “completely at odds” with its values and standards. However, high-profile incidents in recent years appear to be indicative of a longstanding sympathy for far-right culture within elements of the armed forces. Former military personnel have not only stated that offensive and discriminatory language was commonplace, but that troops could display far-right iconography and brag about their exploits within far-right groups without fear of reprisals. Army veteran and “commanding officer” of the far-right National Support Detachment Alek Yerbury claims that his views were not only widely shared in the military, but also largely shaped during his time there. Other former members of the armed forces have suggested that dehumanising training approaches, often including racist language and stereotypes, can sometimes be used in the services training and can potentially contribute to radicalisation into far-right extremism. Worryingly, some allege that senior officers were not only aware of these behaviours, but that they also attempted to cover them up. An urgent report commissioned by the Secretary of State for Defence in April 2019 also casts doubt on the MoD’s accountability procedures, which were described as “a sub-optimal system” for dealing with inappropriate behaviours.

In the police, there are similar concerns about cultures potentially conducive to far-right extremism and a lack of measures to effectively address such behaviours. In March 2023, an independent review of standards of behaviour in the Metropolitan Police (the Met) found an internal culture characterised by systemic and deep-seated racism, misogyny, homophobia and other forms of discrimination. The investigation also highlighted that such behaviours are routinely tolerated, ignored or dismissed as “banter” within a culture of defensiveness and denial that encourages officers and staff to look the other way rather than speak up.

It is not only serving members of the military and police who present an extremism risk. Veterans motivated by far-right ideologies have been convicted of terrorism offences, including the stockpiling of explosives and preparation of attacks. Additionally, former service personnel can be targeted specifically by the recruitment strategies of far-right groups. Veterans have useful skills and experience – some have become responsible for training and fitness programmes in far-right organisations. Characteristics associated with military and police service, such as discipline, honour and courage, are viewed as valuable by far-right organisations. Individuals leaving the forces can lack support, including assistance with mental health needs resulting from their service, and may be at risk of being enticed by the sense of belonging and familiar organisational structure that far-right groups claim to offer. Far-right groups have attempted to exploit this vulnerability, directly contacting former service personnel via social media and charities. A “respite” camp for veterans has been accused of being a “major organising centre of the far-right attended by former soldiers who have shared antisemitic propaganda and threatened armed violence”. Recent years have also seen far-right groups in the UK renew their efforts to co-opt veterans into their narratives as part of a wave of anti-migrant protests, in particular contrasting the treatment of former service personnel with the money and luxuries allegedly afforded to asylum seekers.

These examples give a sense of the threat facing the military and police in the UK from far-right extremism. It is important to note that further specificity in defining and mapping the threat was outside the scope of this paper, but it appears likely from the evidence gathered that these concerns have both institutional and specific, or local, dynamics. Therefore, it is also likely that particular police stations or regions might have more or fewer concerns in this area, depending on their leadership’s approach to how training, policies and culture are monitored and enforced. Within the military, it may be that there are differing levels of concern across the services or, more specifically, across particular roles within the services. Evidence shows that the more operationally focused the role within the security services, the more concern there can be about the cultural dynamics and in-/out-group mentality fostered within such units.

UNDERSTANDING VULNERABILITIES AND STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE

While there are some clear distinctions between the mission and culture of the police and the military in the UK, four areas of concern emerge across both services: vetting of new recruits; the training environments used to ingrain the hierarchal unit structures of the security services; the creation and enforcement of governance procedures for active members; and the services offered to departing members and veteran communities. For each of these areas, there follows a review of current measures in the UK services, an assessment of the limitations of these approaches, and recommendations to help improve the policy and practice of the military and the police to prevent and counter the threat of far-right extremism within their ranks.

VETTING

Vetting processes play a crucial role in preventing far-right extremism within the security forces, primarily for two reasons. First, as discussed in the previous section, far-right organisations actively strategise to infiltrate security forces, viewing them as attractive targets to gain training and access to weaponry. Second, research suggests there are organisational and cultural parallels between far-right groups and security services, which could encourage recruitment to far-right extremism among current and former security force members. Shared features such as organisational hierarchies and gendered role expectations create potential appeal for individuals with far-right leanings. The archetype of a patriotic hero is prevalent in both types of organisation, with a potentially narrow gap between nationalist patriotism and ultra-nationalist viewpoints.

Current Measures

The military has stated that there are “robust measures” in place during their recruitment processes to identify and exclude individuals with extremist sympathies. Similarly, the police claim that all applicants will be subject to “rigorous vetting”. The vetting procedures of both forces rely heavily on recruits self-declaring or disclosing information – including any political or extremist affiliations – via written or online forms. This presents a potential vulnerability, as candidates may choose to withhold or conceal their beliefs. To counter this, the military cross-checks disclosed information against security service records.

All branches of the armed forces additionally mandate interviews or assessment centres that candidates must physically attend. By contrast, national police assessment standards lack this requirement, with major forces such as the Met and West Midlands Police opting for online interviews and assessment centres.

Beyond interviews, most police forces now increasingly scrutinise applicants’ social media profiles. Yet challenges persist in uniformly integrating this into vetting procedures. Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee found some resistance within police forces to incorporating in-depth online screening into standard vetting procedures because of resource and privacy implications. A former head of Counter Terrorism Policing also stated that “people don’t like the idea that their whole internet history is going to be looked at as part of their application for a particular job”.

Both the military and the police have specific tattoo policies in relation to applicants, offering a screening opportunity for extremist affiliations. Applicants with “offensive or intimidating” tattoos are barred from joining the police. Army regulations similarly state that soldiers may not have tattoos that can be viewed as offensive, which the regulations define as having “the purpose or effect of violating another person’s dignity or creating an adverse environment for others … A tattoo should … be considered to have such an effect if … it can be viewed as offensive by an objective standard”. However, the lack of specific guidance on political symbols, iconography, references or proscribed images contrasts with internal Army guidance to soldiers to look out for individuals with “tattoos with overt and covert XRW [extreme right-wing] iconography”.

Current Limitations

Despite the important role vetting can play in barring individuals with extremist views, recent high-profile cases demonstrate the limitations of existing vetting procedures in both the military and the police. For police recruitment, concerns were raised by Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee and His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS), citing insufficient background checks and the appointment of applicants without adequate verification of the information provided on application forms.

Furthermore, the absence of standardised vetting questions across recruitment in police forces in England and Wales contributes to the potential for abuse of the process. Some forces ask applicants to declare that they are “not a current, or previous, member of a proscribed terrorist organisation”, while others refer to “domestic extremism groups”, or make reference to specific organisations such as the British National Party, Britain First, Combat 18 and the National Front. The College of Policing has developed a recommended question that asks applicants, “Have you ever been involved in any actions that could be described as politically, religiously, racially, or environmentally disruptive?”. The open wording of this model question retains ambiguity that might be abused, or even misunderstood, by applicants. However, an extremist candidate’s responses and omissions could nevertheless be considered evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation during vetting, which, if proven, could constitute gross misconduct and would be grounds for automatic dismissal under new police procedures.

Therefore, ambiguity in questions, while not necessarily succeeding in preventing entry to security services by extremist elements, can provide leverage for potential discharge in disciplinary cases.

Social media screening, while potentially contributing to a more comprehensive candidate profile, faces practical challenges such as attribution issues, pseudonym use and unauthorised impersonation, all of which limit its efficacy. Additionally, discriminatory or extremist social media posts are sometimes overlooked or dismissed during the vetting process. After reviewing the applications of 725 serving police officers, HMICFRS found that 68 should never have made it through the vetting process. This includes instances where social media posts that were “potentially discriminatory, inflammatory, or extremist” did not result in the candidate being rejected, with some forces failing to refer to potentially problematic social media content at all in their decision-making. Rather, forces looked to address the issue by advising candidates on their use of social media in future.

Differing “risk appetites” among police forces, influenced by recruitment targets, further compound the problem, with some forces granting “vetting clearance despite knowing disturbing information about applicants”. For example, the Met, even after being criticised in the Casey Review for inadequate vetting, is one of several forces to invite failed applicants to reapply, emphasising a complex balance between maintaining standards and meeting recruitment goals. This dynamic reflects a paradox whereby services that are struggling to recruit, in part as a result of perceptions of racism and sexism in their ranks, may relax vetting practices further to boost recruitment, potentially admitting individuals with undesirable attitudes and influences that perpetuate discriminatory cultures.

Recommendations

1. Standardise and Enhance Vetting Procedures

• Establish standardised vetting procedures across all branches of the military and police forces, ensuring consistent questions and criteria are used during the screening process.

• Include in-person interviews as part of the national assessment standards for the police, providing opportunities to confirm, contextualise and clarify information provided by candidates on application forms.

• Provide comprehensive training and guidance to recruiters and vetting personnel on identifying potential extremist threats, including collaboration with Prevent teams and leveraging of specialist knowledge from experts in the field. There are subtleties and complexities in the symbology of far-right extremism, and non-experts or those without training might easily miss signs of affiliation.

2. Strengthen Online Screening

• Implement more comprehensive and standardised online screening procedures for both military and police recruitment, incorporating lessons from extremist risk assessment frameworks used by security practitioners.

• Conduct thorough checks of social media profiles to identify any potential extremist affiliations, discriminatory content or inflammatory posts.

• Address privacy concerns by ensuring that the screening process is conducted in accordance with relevant legal and ethical guidelines and provide clear explanations to candidates about the purpose and scope of the screening.

3. Expand Reference and Social Circle Checks

• Recognise the importance of gathering insights from individuals who can provide valuable information about the candidate’s background, behaviour and potential extremist affiliations.

• Consider conducting interviews with teachers or school staff, as well as reference checks and interviews with friends, family, colleagues, employers and relevant individuals from the candidate’s immediate social circle as part of the vetting process for both the military and the police.

• Establish clear guidelines and protocols for conducting these interviews to ensure consistency, fairness and respect for privacy.

4. Enhance Tattoo Policies

• Revise tattoo policies to include specific guidance and examples of proscribed symbols, iconography and references associated with far-right extremism, based on information from extremism experts and databases such as those developed by the Anti-Defamation League.

• Train recruiting and vetting personnel on far-right culture, signs, symbols and terminology to enhance their ability to identify extremist tattoos and covert references.

5. Strengthen Oversight and Reporting

• Improve oversight mechanisms to monitor the effectiveness and compliance of vetting procedures in the security forces.

• Ensure there are ethical barriers in place so that recruitment goals do not override vetting requirements.

• Establish clear protocols for reporting concerns identified during vetting, enabling the security forces to make referrals to Prevent for individuals identified as potential extremists or vulnerable to extremism.

• Implement ongoing vetting procedures and continue to develop processes to take appropriate action if individuals fail to meet the vetting criteria or if concerns arise post-recruitment.

TRAINING

Training processes are essential in preventing far-right extremism in the UK security forces, by ingraining awareness and understanding of the threat, as well as providing environments for preventive interventions.

However, it is important to note that the very nature of training processes within the security forces may also contribute to the risk of far-right radicalisation. Basic or initial training serve as the initial point of engagement, embedding values. The bonding effect of a mix of both sanctioned and unsanctioned peer dynamics, isolation, initiation ceremonies, traditions or practices, discipline and even (controlled) violence is sometimes used to create a unit or “in-group”. If this environment or subsequent training environments are infused with discriminatory unit-building practices, this can lower resilience to extremism. Extreme forms of obedience training that instil a willingness to sacrifice one’s life for the collective may foster a toxic hierarchical culture, sense of allegiance to the group, and elitism that can in extreme cases be used to justify extremism.

Additionally, a common element of military training in relation to addressing the need to fight an enemy in defence of the state is “othering”, a formal or informal method used to dehumanise and vilify the enemy – which is seen by some as a tool to make it easier for troops to engage in combat and take lives. As discussed later in this section, dehumanising training methods, including the use of racist terms, have the potential to contribute to far-right radicalisation.

Current Measures

Following Vehvilainen’s conviction, the MoD collaborated with the police and the Home Office to create specific Prevent training for the military. Defence Intelligence’s “Insider Threat” team also participated in joint training, and a policy in March 2019 introduced updates to armed forces training. Recruits in Phase One (basic training) establishments now receive a Prevent briefing, although its content remains unclear. The MoD also aims to raise awareness among key personnel about identifying signs of radicalisation and the Prevent referral process. In 2019, the MoD stated that all personnel would receive some form of Prevent training at least once, either in person or using Home Office-designed e-learning products, with the aspiration of making Prevent training mandatory annually for all personnel.

HMICFRS has found that while most police forces mandate Prevent training using e-learning packages for officers and staff, monitoring and recording of compliance varies among forces, leading to unknown completion rates. While this training likely enhances understanding of radicalisation signs and the Prevent referral process, HMICFRS highlights that the potential vulnerability of staff to extremism was generally excluded from forces’ Prevent training. Officers and staff also felt that e-training was less effective than that delivered in person by facilitators who could make training “directly relevant to the local policing environment”.

Current Limitations

A 2022 Ofsted review of welfare during armed forces’ initial training revealed that while trainees receive security briefings and complete Prevent training during induction, the depth and frequency of updates are insufficient for troop protection. The report recommends detailed and regular training for commanders to enhance understanding of potential national and local risks, including from online sources.

The MoD’s 2019 Report on Inappropriate Behaviours found that mandated training on diversity, inclusion and values sometimes emphasised compliance over long-term behavioural and cultural change. Senior ranks’ under-representation in attendance was noted, and additional training on behaviours, ethics and culture and inclusion, although impactful, was found to not be uniformly deployed across all Defence forces. External stakeholders have suggested that there is a lack of skill and specialist knowledge among the armed forces to deliver training effectively.

Moreover, there is the risk that the training processes within the security forces may even contribute to the risk of far-right radicalisation. A former soldier recruited by the Scottish Defence League claimed that dehumanising training processes, including racist terms, could contribute to radicalisation:

In the army it’s all “raghead this, raghead that” and those terms are used to make us think they are something different to us. You’re more likely to go kill them if that’s what you’ve been trained to think of them as. You’re brainwashed in the army to be more bigoted than racist and it plants that seed of hate in your mind.

A soldier from another regiment spoke of how he and his comrades would “other” everyone outside their battalion as “white P*kis”.

Military and police education and training environments are often the first line of engagement for new recruits, ingraining the service’s associated values in recruits. This type of education often continues throughout the period of service, with training environments serving to reinforce hyper-masculinised norms and role expectations within the ranks. These environments may contribute to susceptibility to far-right extremism. Humour and banter that may be misogynistic and racist is also part of in-/out-group formation, with gallows humour promoting in-group bonding. Examples of this can be seen in the various offensive WhatsApp groups in which police officers have been implicated.

Recommendations

1. Enhance Prevent Training

• Provide detailed and frequent Prevent training to all service personnel, ensuring they understand the potential national and local risks associated with extremism, including from online sources.

• Tailor training to service personnel’s understanding and experience of far-right extremism within their context.

• Provide Prevent training regularly that specifically addresses emerging challenges and incorporate the most up-to-date intelligence.

• Include discussions on the signs of radicalisation, the Prevent referral process and the importance of vigilance in identifying potential threats.

• Include service personnel in the design and delivery of this type of training. Additionally, ensure that sustainable Training of the Trainers systems are established, so that effective engagement continues as individuals move in and out of training roles.

2. Address Training Gaps and Limitations

• Improve the depth and frequency of security briefings and Prevent duty training provided during induction to adequately protect personnel.

• Implement comprehensive training that explores the potential negative implications of military training, including the risks of radicalisation and the impact of potentially dehumanising processes.

• Foster an environment where questions can be asked and addressed by trainers, recognising the limitations of e-training in effectively engaging trainees.

• Ensure that trainers are equipped to deliver training and communicate effectively with the intended audience. Evidence shows that messengers are key to reception of the message.

3. Strengthen Values-Based Education

• Shift the focus of training from compliance to long-term behavioural and cultural change, emphasising the importance of diversity, inclusion and values such as respect, equality and tolerance.

• Ensure that senior ranks actively participate in the training to set a positive example and promote a culture of inclusivity throughout the service.

4. Promote Critical Thinking and Ethical Decision-Making

• Include modules on critical thinking skills and ethical decision-making, enabling security force members to navigate complex situations while upholding democratic values, human rights and accountability.

• Provide training that encourages questioning of stereotypes, biases and extremist ideologies, promoting a culture of critical thinking and challenging extremist narratives.

5. Gender-Sensitive, Intersectional Training

• Incorporate gender-sensitive and intersectional training modules to address the unique challenges and vulnerabilities faced by individuals of different genders within the security forces.

• Provide education on gender dynamics, stereotypes and biases to foster a more inclusive and respectful environment.

• Include discussions on the intersectionality of gender with other identities, such as race, religion and sexual orientation, to ensure a comprehensive understanding of diverse experiences and perspectives.

6. Regularly Evaluate and Update Training Programmes

• Conduct regular evaluations of training programmes to assess their effectiveness in countering far-right extremism.

• Stay informed about best practices, research and global trends in countering violent extremism to ensure training remains up to date.

• Foster a culture of continuous learning and adaptability to effectively respond to emerging challenges and evolving threats.

GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Governance and accountability processes play a crucial role in preventing far-right extremism within the security forces, and are vital in identifying cases where recruits become disillusioned over time. Disillusionment not evident at the vetting stage may arise as new recruits with idealistic notions of their roles confront the harsh realities of work in the security forces, potentially leading to shifts in views and even extremism. The path from patriotic ideals to disillusionment, combined with nationalism and anti-government sentiment, can be driven in part by negative experiences or a perception of failure. These experiences may lead individuals to believe that political elites are not addressing “real problems”, fuelling grievances that can push them towards far-right violent extremism.

Additionally, internal barriers to reporting concerns about extremism can pose a significant challenge. At the division level, it is often up to individuals who happen themselves to belong to an “out-group” to challenge discriminatory and/or extremist sentiments personally, which can result in bullying and suppression of reporting efforts. Military surveys reveal that senior leadership is often less aware than lower-ranked leadership of extremist sentiment within the ranks, potentially due to reduced interaction. Despite the importance of reporting being communicated and encouraged during training, it is often perceived as a betrayal of division unity, marking the individual as a disrupter and pushing them into the out-group. The severity of this sentiment varies across roles, with combat and special operations roles fostering stronger in-/out-group identities due to their reliance on division unity in life-or-death situations.

Current Measures

There are governance and accountability measures in place in the police and military services, with both barring discriminatory attitudes and behaviours. Most UK police forces, mandated by Section 26(1) of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, are bound by the Prevent duty to identify and support individuals who may be vulnerable to radicalisation or involvement in terrorism. However, this does not apply to the MoD, despite calls for a review (including from service personnel themselves), particularly for military police dealing with internal risks presented by staff.

The military police are responsible for investigating extremism-related concerns within the armed forces, with any suspicions about serving members reported in the first instance to civilian police, who then provide the military police unit with advice about appropriate follow-up actions. Defence Intelligence’s Counter Intelligence unit established its “Insider Threat” team in 2018 to counter far-right extremism threats, collaborating with Prevent teams and the police, “one of the only publicly known collaborations between a western military and a formal counter-radicalisation or de-radicalisation programme outside of the armed forces”.

Aside from referring individuals to Prevent, the MoD also retains responsibility for disciplining members who breach standards and values. An internal guide for Army officers emphasises reporting concerns related to possible far-right extremism through the chain of command and the Army Warning, Advisory and Reporting Point. This document appears to be part of a wider effort on the part of the MoD to stress to personnel that far-right extremism will not be tolerated, and to encourage vigilance and reporting of any concerns among personnel.

Current Limitations

While the police investigate reports of individuals engaged in extremism, there is little evidence of specific policies that refer to potential insider threats. An HMICFRS inspection of the police’s contribution to the government’s Prevent programme in 2020 revealed a lack of consideration regarding colleagues’ vulnerability to or engagement in extremism, with few forces having safeguarding arrangements. Similarly, only two forces could provide examples of where they had used the Prevent referral process for members of staff thought to be vulnerable to extremism.

Although the military has said that individuals exhibiting extremist views will be neither tolerated nor permitted to serve, enforcing this policy is complicated, due to unclear guidance on permitted political activities. A report from Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee in July 2022 highlights: “The fact that the Armed Forces do not provide clear direction to service personnel regarding membership of any organisation – let alone an extremist one – would appear to be something of an anomaly”, which it also describes as “a somewhat risky approach”. The government’s response states that MoD staff “are permitted to join non-proscribed groups if and when it is compatible with service values and standards”, and that members may “join political parties and attend political meetings in a personal capacity”. Service personnel, however, may not take part in political marches or demonstrations. This policy seemingly does not account for the increasingly post-organisational nature of the far-right extremist landscape (that is, the transition away from clearly structured organisations towards loose networks of individuals) nor the array of online forums that would not be banned under this definition.

There have also been serious complaints about reporting procedures within the military. Two paratroopers who successfully sued the British Army in 2019 claimed that there was governance-level refusal to acknowledge the issue of far-right extremism and racist ideology, prompting their departure from the force. An MoD 2019 report similarly found existing processes to be inadequate, highlighting the need to “resource, develop and implement an anonymous tool for reporting inappropriate behaviours across Defence”. No progress had been made on this by the 2020 Progress Review, which also recommended the clarification of consequences for unacceptable behaviour, which are “currently not sufficiently visible for people to have confidence that action will be taken if they raise an issue”.

While the Army has established a standard for automatic dismissal, stating that any soldier who receives a custodial sentence for offences related to far-right extremism will be discharged, even this threshold has presented challenges. For example, Royal Navy submariner Kenneth McCourt was not only allowed to remain in the Navy, despite the MoD having knowledge of his links to far-right organisations, but he has also since been promoted, including taking on responsibilities for the training of subordinates.

Recommendations

1. Consider Inclusion of MoD in Prevent Duty and/or Enhance Collaboration Between MoD and Prevent Teams

• Conduct a comprehensive review to determine whether the responsibilities of relevant units within the MoD, such as military police forces handling internal risks, should be included under Prevent.

• Strengthen collaboration between the MoD and Home Office Prevent teams by establishing formal channels for sharing information and concerns related to far-right extremism and potential insider threats.

• Facilitate regular communication and coordination to ensure a unified approach in addressing extremism concerns within the military.

2. Develop Clear Guidelines on Political Activities

• Provide clear guidance to military personnel regarding political activities and the organisations with which they are permitted to engage.

• Define boundaries of and restrictions on political involvement, ensuring alignment with service values and standards.

• Clarify consequences for engaging in unacceptable behaviours or having affiliations with extremist organisations.

3. Strengthen Reporting Procedures

• Implement an anonymous reporting tool for reporting inappropriate behaviours, including extremist ideologies, across the security services.

• Allocate sufficient resources to developing and implementing the reporting tool effectively.

• Improve existing reporting processes to ensure visibility and confidence that appropriate action will be taken in response to reported issues.

4. Review Disciplinary Measures and Discharge Policies

• Assess the effectiveness of current disciplinary measures and discharge policies in addressing far-right extremism and racist ideology within the security services.

• Consider revising discharge policies to ensure automatic dismissal for offences related to far-right extremism, including hate crimes and offences resulting in custodial sentences.

• Review and investigate cases where individuals with extremist links or convictions were allowed to continue serving and take appropriate action, including dismissal if warranted.

SEPARATION

Any significant transition point, such as entering or exiting service, creates the potential for radicalisation or deradicalisation resulting from the disruption of social structures and networks, which can lead to the challenge of ideological viewpoints. Additionally, far-right groups actively target veterans in their recruitment strategies for their useful skills in relation to planning and executing violent acts. Therefore, separation processes are an essential part of preventing far-right extremism in UK security forces.

The phenomenon of “identity fusion”, where personal identity becomes inseparable from the service identity, can pose challenges during separation and reintegration into civilian life. Masculinity expectations, along with stigma around seeking mental health help, may also hinder the transition. Recognising and addressing the practical and psychological impacts of separation is crucial, particularly for those leaving the security forces involuntarily. Grievances and inadequacies post-separation can lead to individuals seeking comfort in far-right militant organisations that might share some similarities in organisational hierarchy and cultural traits.

Hypermasculine environmental expectations can contribute to mental health difficulties such as post-traumatic stress disorder, and could be an indicator of susceptibility to extremism. This is especially true when an individual experiences difficulties transitioning out of service life or a feeling of struggle to maintain hypermasculinity, particularly for those who served in combat or special operations roles and/or in conflict zones. Further focus on the process of “unmaking” martialised masculinity is needed for the benefit of all veterans, but it is also important to remember that there are many intersectional identities held by service personnel that could impact their path in different ways.

Current Measures

Both the military and the police acknowledge the threat to former service personnel from extremist recruitment attempts, with direct targeting by far-right groups via social media and veteran support charities. These groups often draw upon narratives of betrayal of service members by the system, exemplified by stories about homeless veterans. The MoD’s 2019 Prevent policy covers serving personnel, veterans and individuals with links to the military, recognising the ongoing risk of radicalisation and recruitment into far-right extremism beyond active service.

The approach taken in the UK, where civilian structures are involved in addressing cases of extremism within the military, contrasts with that of countries such as Germany, for example, where the Military Counterintelligence Service (Militärischer Abschirmdienst) takes the lead. The UK’s integrated approach, using expertise and lessons from various sectors of the government’s response to extremism, benefits from a broader range of resources and insights beyond the military domain.

Forces such as Greater Manchester Police have implemented programmes to track returning soldiers who served in Iraq or Afghanistan and have been flagged as potential extremism risks. While specific details about the extent of this police programme are limited, it represents a proactive effort to address potential risks associated with extremism among veterans.

There are seemingly fewer structural supports in place for separating or retiring police officers. While there may be non-public efforts by individual police forces or regions, the lack of public evidence of official programmes seems to indicate that the primary effort to support officers who might be experiencing mental or physical challenges with transitioning out of the service is conducted through independent charities.

Current Limitations

There are certain limitations in current approaches to addressing far-right extremism among individuals transitioning out of the military. The case of Alek Yerbury, a self-professed far-right extremist who claims to have left the military due to his “hatred” of the government, reveals a missed opportunity for intervention. Yerbury states that he made his sentiments clear to his superiors during his one-year notice period before leaving the military. This raises questions about whether efforts were made to challenge his extremist views or to report the potential threat or his susceptibility to recruitment into far-right groups.

While the Prevent policy is designed to cover both serving personnel and veterans, a gap appears to exist (according to the available evidence) in interventions or referrals to Prevent when soon-to-be veterans exhibit concerning behaviours or express extremist ideologies. This gap is significant, especially considering that individuals in the process of transitioning out of the military may be at increased risk of recruitment into far-right extremism, as discussed.

There is a range of resources across both the police and military services focused on supporting individuals’ mental and physical health, both during the transition and as veterans. However, these services should continue to be strengthened, especially for the police, for whom it appears there is not yet as much institutional support available. Additionally, these services should aim to be coherent and consistently improving across the different strategies being developed by the UK government and the three devolved legislatures of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Providing support, intervention and referral mechanisms during transitions could be crucial in mitigating recruitment risk and addressing underlying factors contributing to vulnerability.

Recommendations

1. Support Transition and Mental Health

• As well as delivering support programming, engage veterans in defining the challenges they face in transitioning out of a service. Evidence shows that credibility of the messenger is essential to effectiveness.

• Implement comprehensive mental health and wellbeing programmes to address the stress, trauma and psychological challenges faced by security force personnel leaving service.

• Develop tailored resources and interventions to support individuals during the transition period, and provide ongoing mental health support for both serving personnel and veterans.

• Recognise and pre-empt, to the extent possible, the practical and psychological impacts and vulnerabilities associated with the point of separation from a security service.

• Develop targeted interventions that address the specific needs of individuals going through the transition process, taking into account the potential risks of radicalisation and the loss of personal identity tied to the service.

• Establish support programmes specifically designed for individuals who are involuntarily exiting the security services. These should address the unique challenges and vulnerabilities associated with involuntary exits, including feelings of grievance, loss of identity and potential susceptibility to radicalisation. Raise awareness of these particular risk dynamics with existing support services and networks/charities.

2. Monitoring and Evaluation

• Regularly review and update separation procedures within the UK security forces to address the risks and vulnerabilities. Continuously assess their effectiveness in identifying and addressing far-right extremism risks.

• Conduct comprehensive exit interviews with individuals to monitor potential risks and identify concerning behaviours or signs of extremist ideologies. This can provide an opportunity to gather information, address grievances and intervene where necessary.

• Implement monitoring mechanisms to track wellbeing and the reintegration progress, focusing in particular on individuals who have exited involuntarily. Regular check-ins, support networks and follow-up procedures can help identify and address emerging challenges or signs of vulnerability to radicalisation.

• Establish mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the impact of programmes and interventions aimed at preventing and countering far-right extremism. Assess the effectiveness of mental health support programmes, transitional assistance initiatives and referral mechanisms to ensure they meet the needs of security force personnel and reduce the risk of recruitment into extremist groups.

CONCLUSION

In addressing the complex and pressing challenge of far-right extremism within the UK security forces, a multidimensional strategy is essential, encompassing effective vetting, targeted training, robust accountability and dedicated support during the critical transition phase out of service.

Current vetting procedures in the police and military face challenges in identifying and acting on potential extremism concerns, revealing gaps in the process and a failure to address identified extremist vulnerabilities in an appropriate manner. This represents a missed opportunity for early intervention and referral to appropriate services. Lessons from established counterterrorism risk assessment frameworks should inform improvements in vetting. Ongoing vetting is crucial to address evolving risks within the security forces, necessitating strengthened accountability to address threats effectively.

This ties in closely to the importance of training. There is a need to improve prevention-focused training as a regular service requirement, ensuring that trainers are adequately equipped to deliver this type of training. Lessons from existing courses for Prevent practitioners and other security sector partners can guide this process. Training programmes within security forces should integrate insights from research on hypermasculinity and racism. Training efforts should also target cultural issues contributing to mental health concerns. A supportive training environment encouraging help-seeking, addressing mental health stigmas and providing resources can reduce radicalisation risk factors.

Drawing on lessons from other police and military reforms, robust accountability processes are crucial, addressing misconduct, incompetence and extremist ideologies within the security forces. Enforcement of consequences, including dismissal for failure to maintain vetting status, is essential to the integrity and effectiveness of the security forces. These accountability processes should be transparent, consistent and supported by strong leadership to foster a culture of professionalism and prevent the tolerance of extremist views.

The transition out of the police or military represents a critical phase when individuals may be vulnerable to radicalisation. It is important to recognise and pre-empt the practical and psychological impacts of the transition and provide comprehensive support programmes, encompassing mental health and wellbeing support, exit interviews to monitor potential risks and tailored interventions for individuals experiencing involuntary exits. By addressing the specific challenges faced during this transition, the security forces can reduce the risk of recruitment into far-right extremism and promote successful reintegration into civilian life.

Implementing these recommendations requires a comprehensive and integrated approach, drawing lessons from existing frameworks and practices while also adapting to the evolving nature of the threat posed by far-right extremism. Ultimately, such efforts will contribute to the resilience, safety, integrity and trustworthiness of the security forces, protecting both their personnel and the communities they serve.

Claudia Wallner is a Research Fellow in the Terrorism and Conflict team at RUSI. Her research focuses on preventing and countering violent extremism, as well as radicalisation and recruitment into violent extremism, with a particular focus on far-right extremism and terrorism. Claudia co-leads RUSI’s Far-Right Extremism and Terrorism research programme.

Jessica White is a Senior Research Fellow in the Terrorism and Conflict team at RUSI. Her expertise encompasses countering terrorism and violent extremism policy and programming, as well as gender mainstreaming strategies. She has more than a decade’s experience as a researcher, as well as a prior career serving in US military intelligence. Jessica co-leads RUSI’s Far-Right Extremism and Terrorism research programme.

Simon Copeland is a Research Fellow in the Terrorism and Conflict team at RUSI. His research focuses on violent extremist narratives, propaganda and networks. He has also published work on far-right extremism and issues related to the UK counterterrorism strategy (CONTEST).